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The terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 in New York have been putting the air transport sector in de world and the European Union in a deep crisis.
The deregulation of the EU air transport market was already fully accomplished before the tragic events of 9/11. The policy was based on free fare setting and market access, on a fair competitive environment and on common licensing rules for air carriers. In order to eliminate any other unfair cross border competition in the EU air transport sector, complementary actions were adopted by the EU in the post 9/11 era.
Only a minority of these actions were a direct response to the new security problems.
In the meantime the EU demonstrated the ambition to consolidate its air transport policy with many third countries by expanding the European Common Aviation Area. 
The Croatian government participates in this project.
Most business players in the EU air transport market continued the same strategies in the post 9/11 era as they used before, although sometimes in varying degrees of frequency and intensity. High emphasis was put on more efficiency and cost cutting. Typical strategies are membership of alliances, outsourcing non core activities or the focus on niche markets, such as cargo, low-cost and regional operations, leisure and executive business air transport.
In case of future EU membership, Croatia has to adopt the complete legislation – called acquis communautaire - in the field of EU air transport. Problems are not expected because Croatia is already aligned as a member of the European Common Aviation Area. On the business side can be observed that Croatia Airlines is part of the EU air transport network via membership of the Star alliance and other code share agreements.
Croatian domestic and international air routes are very suitable for low-cost and regional operations. A lot of competition in this field can be expected from foreign carriers.




It is a challenging world for the air transport sector. The 9/11 terrorist actions caused a shockwave in the landscape of commercial air transport. Many airline companies decreased capacity, thousands of airline employees in the US and Europe lost their jobs, and air carriers got into trouble. Bankruptcies happened in Europe in he case of Sabena and Swissair and other companies are still struggling, like Alitalia and Olympic. The situation is not really better in the US, where nearly fifty percent of all available seat km (ASK) actually are supplied under chapter 11 protection, which is the last stage before bankruptcy.
The good news is that at the same time the emerging economies of Asia are enjoying a spectacular growth of the airline sector Even in Europe some airline companies have been performing very well since 11 September, 2001.  Some have been clustering together in successful alliances like Star, Oneworld, Skyteam. Other players focused successfully on niche markets such as the low cost segment of the market, the regional and leisure carriers, cargo operators, and executive transport. Most companies involved in the supply chain were performing financially better than the airlines (Doganis, p. 6). A lot of airports and airport groups are in good shape, and the same applies for the global catering and handling companies.
Within this turmoil of highly contrasting events the EU is continuously pushing ahead its liberalized air transport policy which tends to expand vertically and horizontally. The vertical dimension refers to the numerous actions that are adopted by the EU to deepen the liberalization process. This increases the complexity of the acquis communautaire which makes adaptation by new member states a real challenge. The horizontal dimension is the result of the increasing geographical area that is covered by the EU air transport policy. This European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) steadily opens up more markets but makes competition harder.    
As such the liberal EU framework severely limits protectionism and state aid, and requires a high level of managerial efficiency for air carriers to adapt and to survive.
This article will provide a brief overview of the acquis communautaire of the EU air transport policy. Most of the focus will be on the deregulation and the achievements after 9/11, and on the business response of the major players in the EU air transport market. Considering future EU-membership of Croatia, the Croatian government and Civil Aviation Authority will eventually have to cope with all necessary adjustments. Consequently Croatian Airlines, airports, and other players in the air transport market will face a huge competitive challenge.
 

1.	THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAME-WORK
The EU aviation policy does not constitute the highest level of the regulatory environment. The primary authority at world level is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), created in December 1944 by the Convention of Chicago and having its headquarters in Montreal. Worldwide principles have been agreed, such as the sovereignty of airspace, the practice of recommendations, the setting of international standards with respect to safety, environment, etc.  Croatia and the majority of countries in the world are established members of ICAO and subscribe as well most other important international conventions, like for instance the Convention of Montreal dealing with the liability of air carriers towards passengers and their luggage.
Within Europe * the leading specialized organizations are the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), and Eurocontrol.   
All these worldwide and European organizations and conventions are limited to intergovernmental cooperation only, which means that enforcement is not possible.  
While the above mentioned organizations and conventions strictly involve governments and civil aviation authorities, a variety of private organizations and pressure groups constitute an important complementary framework at the business level of the air transport sector. The major air carriers worldwide are grouped in the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and in the Association of European Airlines (AEA Yearbook 2005, p.53) in Europe .The interests of the regional carriers in geographical Europe are represented by the European Regions Airline Association (ERA) and the   Airports Council International (ACI) consists of the membership of international and regional airports.
This listing is not exhaustive but illustrates the high level of institutional complexity at the international and European scenery.


2.	THE EU AIR TRANSPORT POLICY
The most challenging dimension is undoubtedly the EU air transport policy.The policy as such is rather new, and did not really exist before 1985. In the Treaty of Rome (1957) the transport policy in the European Community (EC**) was limited to transport via road, rail and the inland waterways. Maritime and air transport were initially not included. Consequently air transport policy in the member states of the EEC was on a voluntary basis relying on the global and European framework. Company interests were protected by their own national governments and the agenda’s of the business and pressure groups.
The air transport sector in the world and in the EEC was consequently based on a highly regulated market. It was dominated by bilateral agreements between governments about capacity, routes and destinations. It was common practice to restrict the number of airline companies allowed to operate in the domestic and international air transport markets. Indeed, this privilege was in most cases limited to the national flag carrier under the so called single designation principle.












* Europe in this article refers to geographical Europe in contrast to the European Union (EU)   
** EC  (European Community) changed into EU (European Union) since 1992
2.1.1.	 Free pricing
Free pricing in the air transport sector is one of the main achievements of the deregulation process in the EU. This policy made it possible for an entire new type of air carrier to emerge. Based on the Southwest experience in the US, several low-cost (no-frills) airlines have been entering the EU aviation market and are performing very well (Lawton, p. 35 – 36).
They are represented in Europe by the European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA).
By applying efficient managerial techniques, these carriers are able to reduce the average cost per seat/km by up to 59% compared to that of a traditional carrier (Doganis,  p.150).
As these low-cost carriers do not offer a business class, they are able to fit more seats in the same aircraft, delivering an average cost reduction per seat/km of 16%.
By using less busy airports (like London Stansted instead of London Heathrow; Frankfurt Hahn instead of Frankfurt Main, etc.) less time is lost between arrival and re-departure which creates a higher degree of utilization of the aircraft and a cost reduction of 3% per seat/km. Another 6% cost reduction is possible due to the lower user fees at these airports. Cost reductions of 3% are possible by lower labor costs and 2% can be saved by flying the same type of aircraft and outsourcing maintenance. 




Deregulation packages gradually liberalized market access conditions. Since April 1997 cabotage has been allowed in the EU. 
Free market access in general has brought with it a hard time for many inefficient flag carriers. A number of them were state-owned and habitually made up their losses by availing of tax money. It became apparent very soon that some airline companies could cope with the new deregulated reality, while other carriers could not escape from their corporate culture of staying afloat by subsidies. It became a fact of life in the EU that privatization in the airline sector became one of the vital instruments to make the airlines strong enough to survive the jungle of competition and instability after 11 September.
There is however no legal obligation for privatization – neither for Croatia Airlines - , and there are cases of state owned carriers (like TAP in Portugal) that perform financially very well.
Capital injections by governments in state owned airlines should comply with the market investor principle to avoid unfair competition with private carriers (ICAO, Government intervention in air transport in the European Union, p. 2). 
Further, state subsidies in the EU to airline companies have become very restricted and even impossible. However article 87 of the Treaty of Nice still accepts strict exceptions for regional and sector aid .The Commission can allow state aid in case of public air service obligations and to overcome financial difficulties due to an unexpected crisis (ICAO, Government intervention in air transport in the European Union, p. 2 -3). After 9/11 EU governments were allowed to provide temporary subsidies to air carriers to overcome the sudden increase of the war-risk insurance premiums.
Air carriers that are in a restructuring stage and that can deliver a good business plan can be allowed to get state aid on a one time last time basis (ICAO, European experience of air transport liberalization, p. 4). This type of aid is conditional and air carriers can be forced by the Commission to refund the state aid if conditions are not met. A recent case is that of Olympic Airways which will have to pay back illegal state aid to the Greek government (Commission, IP/06/531). 




The EU antitrust policy – frequently called competition policy – aims to maintain fair cross-border competition between companies in the EU. Pure domestic distortion of competition still falls under the application of national competition authorities. As air transport in the EU is frequently a cross-border activity, EU competition policy is applicable in most cases.
Article 81 in the treaties (Art. 85 before the Treaty of Amsterdam) puts rules and restrictions on agreements between companies: “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object of effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market,…”

A lot of cooperative agreements between air carriers over the years have been the subject of investigations of the EU Commission (Corduant and van de Wouwer, p.98).
But even when some of these agreements cause negative cross border impacts on competition, the Commission can authorize such agreements when the positive impact – for instance on the passengers – compensates for the negative impact on competition.
Many predetermined authorizations – the so-called block exemptions – have been granted to the airline sector as part of the three deregulation packages. Examples are agreements on schedule coordination, tariff consultations, slot allocation agreements at airports, common computer reservation systems.
In some cases such as alliances, far reaching cooperative agreements, code-sharing, etc.., the Commission can open a specific investigation resulting in a positive or negative conclusion, and fines can be imposed in case of violations. The attitude of the Commission in the majority of the cases is not very prohibitive as most agreements such as alliances and vertical integration with regional carriers are authorized. 
In case of dominant positions, Article 82 (Art. 86 before the Treaty of Amsterdam) applies: “Any abuse by one ore more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States…” .
In a very recent case, British Airways got subject to a complaint from Virgin Atlantic which resulted in a fine of 6.8 million EUR imposed by the EU (European Court of Justice, Case C-95/04 P).
BA abused its dominant position in its relation with air travel agencies in the UK, with the intention to push competitors – such as Virgin Atlantic – out of the market.
Dominant positions that are the result of mergers, even when no abuses occur, are regulated by the Council Regulation 4064/89 recently amended by Regulation 139/2004.






2.1.4.	Common licensing rules of air carriers
As the result of the third deregulation package, full freedom to start an airline has become possible since 1992. Based on Regulation 240/92, all civil aviation authorities of the EU countries should give equal treatment to companies applying to get licensed as a Community air carrier. One of the necessary requirements is Community ownership, and a solid business plan providing for financially sound operations in the future. 
An air carrier’s operating license can only be granted and remain valid if the company is in possession of a valid Air Operators’ Certificate (AOC).
The civil aviation authorities will deliver an AOC when the operator demonstrates the professional and technical ability and organization to run the safe operation of aircraft.




The deregulation constitutes the fundamental framework of the EU air transport policy and it was fully established at the start of the 9/11 era. It constitutes the basic acquis communautaire which by all actual and new member states should be adopted.
The EU air transport policy moves steadily in the direction of a common policy, leaving less national degrees of freedom to rely on the subsidiarity principle (Assess, p. 17 – 18).
There is a strong political belief in the world and in the EU that deregulation is the only way towards the development and the survival of the air transport market. 
Politicians however overlook some critical questions that are raised in theoretical discussions about the long term market stability. This debate is typical for sectors with high fixed costs and as such could be applicable to the air transport sector. A deregulated air transport market with too many players could end up in a situation where nobody is able to survive 
Symptoms could be the low historical and actual profit margins of the air transport sector, the many cases of bankruptcy protection in the US, commercial failures and bankruptcies.
In the maturity stage, even the no frills carriers eventually can be expected to become subject to the same problem.
A brief overview of this theoretical issue can be found in Button (Air transport networks, p. 169 – 189). 
2.2.	Complementary acquis communautaire
Unfair cross border competition in the EU air transport sector still could be possible if member states were allowed to implement pure national actions in complementary fields such as safety, security, air traffic control, congestion and environment, passenger rights, insurance, and other.
This explains why the EU has been complementing the packages of deregulation with numerous additional Regulations and Directives (www.europa.eu).
 In contrast to Regulations, Directives constitute less intense legislation. They impose a particular goal but allow some levels of freedom about the specific way of implementation. They only can be enforced in a member state after prior incorporation in national law.  
Many of these complementary actions have been introduced after 2000, especially those  dealing with the new challenges of security of the 9/11 era.
The complementary acquis communautaire affects not only the governments of the actual and new member states, but as well air carriers, airports and air traffic management. 
The EU continues its project of the European Common Aviation Area (Commission, COM/2004/74 final, p. 5 – 6 and COM/2005/79 final, p. 8). The full implementation of the ECAA is expected by 2010, and will integrate the EU aviation markets with those of the states at the south and the east of the common borderline. As Croatia participates in the ECAA  it is as such already fully aligned with EU air transport policy (Commission, IP/06/582). Future EU membership will make Croatia an integrated part as well of the Open Skies Agreements which the EU tries to sign with major other countries in the world. The only limitation is that existing and
new bilateral air agreements of Croatia will have to be or become fully compatible with EU Regulation 847/2004. 
Furthermore Regulation 437/2003 and 1358/2003 make full cooperation of member states  mandatory in providing statistical air transport data about passengers, cargo and mail. 
Most other actions rely on particular Directives, dealing with issues such as air safety in Directives 2003/42, 94/56 and 2004/36, the mutual acceptance of licenses for cockpit and cabin crew in Directive 91/670, etc.
The impact of the national civil aviation authorities will diminish in the future as the European Air Safety Agency (EASA) will take over a lot of responsibilities in the field of aviation safety and airworthiness requirements.
The acquis communautaire for airline companies consists of the three packages of deregulation and several other Regulations about mandatory insurance, computer reservation systems, denied-boarding compensation, technical requirements and administrative procedures. Steadily new proposals are initiated by the Commission, such as procedures for informing passengers about the carrier’s identity, revised limits on maximum duty time for cockpit and cabin crew, etc.  
Airports are affected by Directive 2002/30 about noise abatement, Directive 96/67 sets the principles for ground handling at airports, and new legislation is expected to deal with excessive user fees that are charged on some EU airports (Pilling, “Campaign trail”, p. 51 – 52). 
Airports and air carriers both are subject to the slot Regulation 793/2004 and rules are in the pipeline for travelers with reduced mobility.
Civil aviation security has become a high priority since 9/11 and this clears the ground for the strict common rules on security control to be followed by EU airports and governments.
It is the ambition of the EU to create a Single European Sky in order to increase airspace capacity and to reduce congestion and delays. The Commission has become very active in this field since 2004, by publishing a series of important Regulations.


3.	STRATEGIES IN THE AIR TRANSPORT SECTOR
The demand for air transport is indirect and depends primarily on global economic activity (Doganis, 2001). Consequently international air transport is a highly volatile business, expanding when the economy is booming and declining in periods of economic recession (OACI, p. 81). Variables such as high fuel prices and environmental constraints can cause a deeper and more intensive recession in the air transport market.    
Most analysts of ICAO, Airbus, Boeing, and other, expect for the middle term a continuous world wide growth in the air transport sector. According to the IATA forecasts up to 2009, international passenger traffic growth is expected to increase by 5.6 % per year and even by 6.3 % for freight (IATA, Passenger and freight forecast until 2009).     
The model used by Eurocontrol forecasts in Europe for the period 2006 - 2009 an average annual traffic growth of 3.7 %, ranging under extreme assumptions between minimum 2.4 % and 5.3 % (Eurocontrol, p. 2). 
The air transport business generates many positive feed back effects on the economy. 
The impact on European jobs was estimated to range in 2004 between 4.1 million jobs to 7.5 million with all spin-off effects included, realizing an added value between $ 274 billion up to 1,041.7 billion (ATAG, p. 25).  Regional economic activities, such as tourism in Croatia, can get extra stimuli by more inbound tourist passengers (ACI Europe, p. 41 – 45).
The area which is most vulnerable to business cycles is the middle segment of the passenger air travel market. It involves the typical tourist-class passengers with higher elasticity of price and income. This market segment can be served very well by the typical low-cost carriers and this is why most of these operators see their businesses booming in periods of recession. On the other hand, the high price low number business travelers are of premium importance for most airline companies. Special actions such as frequent flyer programs try to seduce the business traveler (Shaw, p. 206 – 214).
Moreover, during economic recessions, a switch from business to tourist class can be observed. 
Of crucial importance for airline companies is to keep the yield/cost ratio larger than unity. One of the necessary – although not sufficient – key variables is a high load factor. When load factors are structurally declining, overcapacity becomes a major problem (Morrell, p. 8 – 10).
In the volatile context of the air transport market, carriers inevitably have to demonstrate sufficient flexibility to adapt their capacity to the cyclical evolution of demand.
Success and survival of a carrier will depend primarily on the speed and the intensity of these capacity adjustments.
Fast capacity adjustments are even more important to deal with unexpected external shocks, such as 9/11, the outbreak of SARS, the war in Iraq. 
Many carriers traditionally are reluctant to reduce capacity, primarily because this will inevitably cause layoffs and create problems with the labor unions. Although there was already an overcapacity problem before the tragic events of 9/11, only a few airline companies at that time were willing to react appropriately (Airline industry grounded again, p.61 – 62). Major downsizings, however, occurred worldwide after 11 September 2001. In many cases, these were rather late adjustments to the slowing economy and 11 September was just used as the more socially acceptable justification. It was in some respects the excuse that came at the right time.
As less capacity is needed, routes have to be cancelled, flight frequencies reduced, and aircraft have to be taken out of service. After 9/11 over two thousand big commercial jets were parked in the deserts of Arizona and California, just waiting for better times to come, and this number was double that of the period immediately before the terrorist attacks (Kingsley-Jones, p. 36 – 38).
Airline companies using flexible leasing contracts can enjoy a competitive advantage over carriers using fully-owned aircraft (Morrell, p. 197 - 212). 
Another solution to cut capacity consists in using smaller aircraft (Shifrin, p. 12) which can explain the increasing importance of the regional carriers in the US and the EU.




The strategies of many European air carriers are based on membership of one of the major alliances. Depending on the airline company, objectives of alliance membership could be market-defensive, market offensive and efficiency-seeking (Kleymann, p. 35 – 45).
The most intensive type of cooperation is code-sharing and schedule co-ordination, followed by frequent flyer programs and lounge sharing, co-operation about broader marketing and technical matters.
The STAR alliance has been for a number of years the market leader, realizing on average 26 % of worldwide airline revenues. 
Croatia Airlines is a regional member of the Star Alliance since 15 December 2004 (www.croatiaairlines.hr), enjoying since then access to the worldwide Star network.
Connections to this huge network are a real must for a small carrier as Croatia Airlines which was in 2004 in position 220 in the world airline rankings based on revenue passenger/km (The Airline Rankings, p. 79).  
Table 1. 
STAR alliance members
Carriers  	  Revenue in $ million (2004)
	









LOT-Polish Airlines      	802
Lufthansa  	21,101
SAS  	7,921
Singapore Airlines    	7,334
Spanair	1,084





Source: Field, p. 46
The second most important player is SKYTEAM, with a 19.6 % share in the world market. Its members are Aeromexico, Air France-KLM, Alitalia, Continental Airlines, CSA Czech Airlines, Delta Airlines, Korean Air, Northwest Airlines, Air Europa, China Southern, Copa Airlines, Kenya Airways, Tarom.
ONEWORLD is the third major group, with 14.5 % share in world wide revenue.
Members are Air Lingus, American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia Airlines, Lan, Quantas Airways, Malev.
Croatia Airlines has been signing as well individual cooperation agreements with some airline companies outside the Star alliance. In this way Croatia Airlines is able to offer flights to the most important hubs in the EU, such as Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Munich, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Zurich (World Airline Directory, p. 46). 
An important advantage of the economic power of the airline alliances is the pressure they can put on the hubs and the major airports they are using. Strong bargaining power is necessary to get a good location at the airport for gates, in check facilities, hangars for maintenance and cargo handling, etc. Last but not least, the market power of airports tends to increase because they follow the movement towards globalization by setting up  alliances as well. So far the financial results are very good taking into account that profit margins are in the double digit area.
Table 2.
Key data of the leading European airport alliances (2004)
Airport Group             Revenue ($ million)            Operating margin      
BAA: London Gatwick, Heathrow, Stansted, Southampton, Aberdeen-Dyce, Edinburgh, Glasgow
                               3,902.6                           31.8 %
AENA: Madrid, Barcelona; 3 airports in Colombia (Cartagena, Barranquilla, Cali); 12 Mexican airports including Guadalajara
                               2,615.5                           11.9 %
FRAPORT AG: Frankfurt Main, Lima Jorge Chavez International, Antalya (Turkey), Portway Handling de Portugal, Hanover, Brisbane Airport, Frankfurt Hahn
                               2,541.9                            13.8 %
AEROPORTS DE PARIS: Paris Charles de Gaulle, Paris Orly, Le Bourget, Beijing Capital International Airport, France Handling, Liège Airport (Belgium), Phnom Penh (Vietnam)
                               2,264.9                            33.1 %
SCHIPHOL GROUP: Amsterdam Schiphol, Rotterdam, Lelystad, JFK New York, Stockholm Arlanda, Jakarta Soekarno Hatta (Indonesia), Aruba Queen Beatrix International (Netherlands Antilles)
                               1,131.4                             28.4 %
Source: Mountford, p. 59 – 62.
Other global airport groupings with participation of European partners are Abertis (Spain), Aeroporti di Roma (Italy), Copenhagen Airports (Denmark), Dublin Airport Authority (Iereland),
Ferrovial (Spain), Flughafen Wien (Austria), Hochtief AirPort (Germany), Infratil (New Zealand), Macquarie Airports (Australia), Malaysia Airports Berhad , Manchester Airports Group (UK), Peel Airports (UK), SEA Aeroporti di Milana (Italy), Unique (Switzerland), Vinci Airports (France).
The ways of cooperation within the global airport groupings vary between management contracts, joint ventures and equity stakes. The financial results are superior compared to the airline groups. The profitability gap airport versus airline group for operating margin was on average 18.3 % for the period 2004 – 2005 (Baker, “Fighting talk”, p. 51). This gap never dropped under 18 % for the period 1999 – 2005, even not after 9/11 
As deregulation in the EU causes more competition in the air transport market, yields are under constant pressure, making it a huge challenge for carriers to keep the yield/cost ratio above unity.
More efficiency and appropriate cost reductions are an absolute must in order to survive.




Air carriers who focus on their core transportation business can outsource non-essential activities to other specialized companies. Most vertical outsourcing can be spotted in the fields of maintenance, catering and ground handling, while horizontal outsourcing refers to routes that are subcontracted to other carriers.
Global players in the catering sector and ground handling offer services worldwide to hundredths of airline companies. The major players in ground handling
realized in 2004 a total worldwide revenue of $ 4,898.8 million, which is 10.8% higher than the year before (Conway, “Common vision”, p. 42). The four largest players – Swissport, Servisair/GlobeGround, Fraport Ground Services, Worldwide Flight Services – have a stake of nearly 70 % in this worldwide revenue. 
In the field of catering, the four global dominating companies are LSG Sky Chefs, GateGourmet, Servair, and Alpha Flight Services. 
Based on high volume and synergies these global services companies enjoy economies of scale and scope and consequently their services can be supplied at lower prices compared to airline companies who are performing these operations independently.




Leading civil maintenance operators in Europe (2003)
Company                                           Country                      Revenue $ million
Lufthansa Technik                                Germany                       4,922
Air France industries                             France                          2,162
SR Technics Holdings                          Switzerland                  1,142
KLM Eng & Maint                               Netherlands                     916
BA Engineering                                    UK                                  847
Alitalia Eng & Maint                            Italy                                 750
SAS Technical                                      Sweden                            680
Iberia Eng & Maint                              Spain                                500
Finnair Technical Services                   Finland                            238
TAT Industries                                     France                              212
Sabena Technics                                  Belgium                            165
Source: Pilling, M., “Service challenge”, p. 52
  Horizontal outsourcing is possible in the field of feeder services. Many airline companies
use the services of regional carriers to transport passengers to their major hubs.




The analysis so far has been limited to the strategies of the main carriers, but smaller parts of the market could offer interesting opportunities to niche players, such as cargo, the low cost operators, the regionals, the leisure carriers, and executive air transport.
Is air cargo an independent niche market? A double approach can be observed in the air cargo market. Many flag carriers still consider cargo as a complementary activity to their scheduled passenger flights. Cargo is transported in the belly space of the aircraft or on board of pax/combi aircraft. Some flag carriers are using full freighters and sometimes set up an independent cargo division in their organizational structure. Lufthansa Cargo is a typical example.
The real cargo niche market is served by those carriers who operate full freighters only, such as Cargolux and Polar Air Cargo, or by the express services of Federal Express, UPS, TNT, DHL . 
In line of globalization and economies of scale, full freight operations are becoming steadily more important. Cargo alliances on the other hand are still less popular than the passenger alliances. Skyteamcargo runs parallel to the passenger Skyteam alliance, and WOW consists of Singapore Airlines cargo, Japan Airlines Cargo, SAS Cargo, Lufthansa Cargo. To reduce the paperwork in the air cargo business an initiative, called Cargo 2000, was initiated by IATA with the aim to increase the efficiency and to lower costs (Conway, “Paper farewell”, p. 48 – 50). 
Most cargo operators are member of The International Air Cargo Association (TIACA).

Table 4.















Source: Tacoun, p. 59.
   

The basic concept of the low cost phenomenon has already been discussed in paragraph 2.1.1. The typical niche market served by the no-frills carriers is point to point short haul transportation. Growth rates in terms of revenue are very high, up to double digit level for some European operators.
Table 5.
Revenue growth rates in the European low-cost air transport sector
Carrier                                      Growth rates 2004 - 2005
easyJet                                       + 26.7 %
Ryanair                                      + 31.7 % 
Air Berlin                                  + 14.9 % 
Germanwings                            + 61.2 % 
Hapag-Lloyd Express                + 40.9 %
Norwegian                                 + 69.5 %
Source: Baker, “Blurring the model”, p. 44.
The low-cost sector is continuously transporting more passengers, even during 2001, a disastrous year for the airline industry (Button-AEA, p. 27). Because of the typical low fares, half of the low-cost passengers are new. They would either not have traveled at all or would have used alternative transportation.










Low fare airline connections to Croatia
Air carrier                                   Route
Aer Lingus                                  Dublin – Dubrovnik
easyJet                                         Manchester/London Gatwick – Split/Rijeka
Estonian Air                                Tallinn – Dubrovnik
Fly Globespan                             Glasgow – Pula
Fly Lal                                         Vilnius – Dubrovnik
Germanwings                              Cologne/Berlin/Stuttgart – Split/Dubrovnik
Hapag-Lloyd Express                 Germany – Rijeka/Dubrovnik
InterSky                                       Friedrichshafen – Zadar
Norwegian                                   Norway – Rijeka/Split/Dubrovnik
Onair                                            Pescara – Split
ScandJet                                       Sweden/Denmark – Zagreb/Pula
Sky Europe                                  Central Europe – Zadar/Split/Dubrovnik
Wizz Air                                       London/Budapest - Zagreb/Split
Source: www.attitudetravel.com/croatia/lowcostairlines
Regional carriers are operating smaller aircraft in a typical range between 50 to 100 seats, serve mostly regional airports with lower landing fees, pay lower wages to staff, and have less overhead costs because of a more simplified organizational structure.
They have lower costs than the majors, but higher than the no frills carriers
They serve distances op to 500 km. Most of the European regional passengers (73 %) are transported by captive feeders. They fly passengers to the major hubs in Europe and are majority or fully owned by the major carriers, while only 1 % of the passengers use the services of an independently owned feeder (Regional ranking 2005, p. 52). In contrast to Europe, independent US feeders constitute the most important niche market as they transport 52 % of all regional passengers.  
The only genuine regional niche market in Europe is that of the independent regional carriers who operate their own routes and network. They represent 26 % of all regional passengers carried. 
Because of the short range distances, domestic air transport in Croatia and to the immediate countries in the neighborhood is very suitable to be served by regional air transport. 
The underlying table illustrates the number of passengers carried by the most important regional carriers in Europe.
Table 7.
Largest regional airlines in Europe (2005)
Airline                               Country               Passengers (x 10³)
Lufthansa Cityline             Germany             5,975Air Nostrum                       Spain                  4,689Austrian Arrows                Austria                4,107Aegean Airlines                 Greece                4,007Régional                             France                3,745Brit Air                               France                3,484BA Connect                       UK                      3,407KLM Cityhopper               Netherlands         2,922Binter Canarias                  Spain                   2,700Eurowings                         Germany              2,693Alitalia Express                 Italy                     2,128KLM Cityhopper UK        UK                       2,021Wideroe’s Flyveselskap    Norway                1,825


Source: Regional ranking 2005, p. 57.
In contrast to the typical short distances of the regional carriers, the leisure carriers -called as well charter companies - serve average trip lengths of more than 2,000 km. As seats are pre sold to tour operators, they enjoy high load factors and can charge relatively low fares. Most of the tour operators are selling holiday packages, including air travel, accommodation and various tourist activities. Ticket only selling is frequently available, but is not the primary business of charter airlines.
As is indicated in table 8, some tour operators are using their own aircraft.
On less high density destinations, seats can be booked with other air carriers even with scheduled airlines.
Table 8.
Key data for the leading European tour operators (2004)
TUI Tourism:  revenue $ 16,322 million
Carriers                     Country             Passengers (x 10³)      Average trip length (km)
Thomsonfly                 UK                     8,100                                2,519
Hapagfly                      Germany            7,100                                2,366
Corsair                         France                2,100                                5,810
Britannia Nordic          Sweden              1,150                                3,530
Tui Belgium                 Belgium             1,000                                2,300

Thomas Cook Airline Group: revenue $ 9,094 million
Carriers                   Country             Passengers (x 10³)      Average trip length (km) 
Condor Flugdienst          Germany           7,110                                 3,027
Thomas Cook Airlines    UK                    5,010                                 2,862
SunExpress                     Turkey               1,160                                 2,266    
Thomas Cook Airlines    Belgium               970                                  2,455

My Travel Airways: revenue $ 5,914 million
Carriers                      Country             Passengers (x 10³)      Average trip length (km)
MyTravel Airways       UK                    6,380                                 2,812
MyTravel Airways A/S Denmark          2.900                                 2,666
Source: Baker, “New horizons: Focus leisure travel”, p. 92 – 99.

The International Air Carrier Association (IACA) looks after the interests of the leisure carriers, but nevertheless their market position is actually threatened by the low cost competition.
There are multiple reasons. Tour operators traditionally offer fixed package holidays and  rely on early bookings, up to many months before departure. Many consumers today decide increasingly for shorter but more frequent holidays. A faster and more flexible  solution for a holiday seeker is to book on line: the flight with a no frills carrier, hotel accommodation, a rental car, and other tourist services. This market behavior of  dynamic packaging could be an early symptom that the life cycle of the traditional package holiday is ending.
Some charter airlines understood the message, and have introduced in the meantime low cost operations as well. Typical examples are Hapag-Lloyd Express and Air Berlin. 
Other carriers in the charter business start to substitute the short haul charter flights by the more profitable long-haul destinations outside Europe.
While the low cost carriers serve the bottom end of the air transport market, the premium part is taken care of by business and executive air transport.
It is a recent trend that some scheduled air carriers introduce on selected routes exclusive business class flights only. Lufthansa has some scheduled business flights only from Düsseldorf and München to US destinations. The operations are outsourced to the Swiss carrier Privatair who uses modified Airbuses A319LR and Boeings 737 BBJ. These aircraft have a limited number of seats because of the business class configuration and have long range tanks for the long haul route to the US. KLM introduced recently a similar service between Amsterdam and Houston.
Top of the market is the segment of business aviation, making it possible for business travelers to use private air transportation. Air taxi operators can provide different range of aircraft, from twin piston engine aircraft to business jets. Some companies operate their own business jets, sometimes shared with other companies under a fractional ownership arrangement (Warwick, p. 83 – 85).  Private business aircraft are increasingly used since 9/11, as less security risk is involved. 




The EU air transport policy hardly existed before 1985. The European air transport market was subject to the institutional framework of the ICAO at world level, of the ECAC at European level, and finally of the national civil aviation authorities at domestic level. International air transport – as well in Europe – was dominated by restrictive bilateral agreements between governments, resulting in a highly inefficient air transport market.
This anticompetitive situation was reversed for the first time in the world by the American Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, followed by a similar initiative in the European Community. Free pricing and market access, fair competition and common licensing rules for air carriers were successfully introduced in the European Union before the tragic events of 11 September, 2001.
The EU did not hesitate to continue in the post 9/11 era its liberalized air transport policy.
Most Regulations and Directives during the last years have been adopted aiming at  deepening the liberalization process. Only a minority of actions were directly related to the problems of 9/11, such as common EU rules for security controls at airports and minimum mandatory insurance for air carriers.
At the same time, the EU tried to integrate the EU aviation markets with external partners by expanding the European Common Aviation Area. Croatia participates in this ECAA project, and is as such already aligned with EU air transport policy.
The basic business strategies applied in the EU air transport sector did not fundamentally change after 9/11, although some business responses occurred at a higher frequency and more intensively. Illustrative were the drastic capacity reductions in the sector immediately after the terrorist attacks.
Most other strategies aiming at increased efficiency and cost cutting continued in the same way as in the past: airline and airport alliances, outsourcing in the sector of catering, ground handling and maintenance. Some niche markets continued the upward trend, especially the extreme segments of the market served by the low-cost operators and executive business carriers.
Many regional carriers are feeding passengers into the main hubs of the major airlines or are operating their own short distance network. Leisure carriers are switching into longer haul flights and start to introduce as well ticket only low-cost operations as a substitute to the declining full package holiday formula. Cargo operations tend to become more a specialized business by the expanding market share of the full freighters and express services.
Croatia Airlines is integrated in the EU air transport network via membership of the Star alliance and its bilateral code share agreements with other major carriers in Europe. 
The growing tourist sector could enhance additional growth for the Croatian air transport sector.
It will depend on appropriate and correct management strategies whether this growth will create new opportunities for Croatian companies, such as Croatia Airlines. Especially foreign low-cost and regional operators could constitute a huge competitive challenge.  
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Teroristički napad 11. rujna 2001. godine u New Yorku uzrokovao je veliku krizu u svjetskom i europskom zračnom sektoru. 
Deregulacija tržišta zračnog transporta Europske Unije već je bila potpuno ostvarena i prije tragičnog događaja 11. rujna, koja je bila bazirana na politici slobodnog pristupa tržištu, okružju lojalne konkurencije i pravilima zajedničkog licenciranja za zračne prijevoznike. Europska Unija je usvojila dopunske mjere u razdoblju nakon 11. rujna kako bi se uklonila bilo koja druga međugranična  konkurencija u zračnom sektoru Europske Unije, od kojih je samo nekolicina bila izravan odgovor novonastalim problemima osiguranja.
U međuvremenu Europska Unija je pokazala želju za konsolidaciju svoje politike zračnog prometa sa mnogim zemljama trećeg svijeta tako što je proširila European Common Aviation Area (Europski Zajednički Zračni Prostor). Hrvatska vlada sudjeluje u ovom projektu.
Većina poslovnih sudionika na tržištu zračnog prometa Europske unije zadržali su istu strategiju u razdoblju nakon 11. rujna, iako  katkad s promjenjivim stupnjem učestalosti i intenziteta. Poseban naglasak je bio stavljen na većoj efikasnosti i smanjivanju troškova.
Tipične strategije su članstvo u udruženjima, eksternaliziranje netemeljne djelatnosti ili usredotočenje na tržišne niše kao što je teret, jeftine i regionalne operacije, zračni transport za odmor i privredne subjekte.
U slučaju članstva u Europskoj Uniji, Hrvatska mora potpuno usvojiti zakonodavstvo vezano za zračni transport Europske Unije – nazvano acquis communautaire. Ovdje se ne očekuju nikakvi problemi za Hrvatsku budući da je ona već priznata kao član European Common Aviation Area (Europskog Zajedničkog Zračnog Prometa).
Gledajući s poslovnog aspekta primjećuje se da je Croatia Airlines član mreže zračnog transporta Europske Unije i to putem članstva u udruženju Star i ostalih ugovora u sličnim udruženjima.
Hrvatske domaće i međunarodne zračne linije su veoma pogodne za jeftine i regionalne operacije. U ovom polju se može očekivati dosta konkurencije od strane stranih zračnih prijevoznika.
Ključne riječi: deregulacija, acquis communautaire, eksternalizacija, tržišna niša      
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